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Abstract: Avian influenza viruses of the subtype H6Nx are being detected globally with increasing
frequency. Some H6Nx lineages are becoming enzootic in Asian poultry and sporadic incursions into
European poultry are occurring more frequently. H6Nx viruses that contain mammalian adaptation
motifs pose a zoonotic threat and have caused human cases. Although currently understudied
globally, H6Nx avian influenza viruses pose a substantial threat to both poultry and human health.
In this review we examine the current state of knowledge of H6Nx viruses including their global
distribution, tropism, transmission routes and human health risk.
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1. Introduction
Influenza A viruses (IAV), including Avian Influenza Viruses (AIV), are members of the
Orthomyxoviridae family and contain a segmented, ribonucleic acid (RNA) genome. Each genome
consists of eight, negative sense, single stranded viral RNA (vRNA) segments enveloped in a
host-derived lipidmembranewith two surface glycoproteins: haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase
(NA). Di↵erences in the antigenicity and phylogenetics of these surface proteins allow characterisation
of AIV into subtypes H(x)N(y). Individual isolates are named according to the pattern: antigenic
type (A, B, C, D), host of origin, geographical location, strain number and year of isolation [1]. This is
then succeeded by H(x)N(y) (e.g., A/American Green-winged Teal/Ohio/18OS2656/2018 (H6N1)).
Where the host of isolation is Human, the host of origin is omitted from the strain name (e.g.,
A/Taiwan/2/13 (H6N1)).
The influenzaAvirus genome encodes 10 core proteins and a variable number of accessory proteins.
The genome is coated in viral nucleoprotein (NP) and adopts a twisted pan handle conformation
with trimeric polymerase (PA, PB1 and PB2) attached, forming a ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex.
The RNP is encircled by the M1 matrix protein which is surrounded by a host-derived lipid bilayer
envelope in which the HA and NA as well as the M2 matrix protein are embedded [2]. Additionally,
the core non-structural protein (NS) encodes an mRNA transcript that is alternatively spliced to express
two proteins involved in innate immune modulation and export of RNPs from the nucleus [3].
The primary natural host of IAVs are wild aquatic birds (mainly of the order Anseriformes) [4,5]
with the exception of H17N10 and H18N11 which have exclusively been isolated from bats [6]. AIVs
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may also cause sporadic incursions in domestic poultry; evidenced by H7N1 outbreaks in Italy from
1990 to 2000, and additionally in humans and other mammalian species [7–9].
AIVs can be classified into two groups as a result of clinical disease or molecular signature within
their HA segment; low-pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) and high-pathogenic avian influenza
virus (HPAIV) [10]. Specifically, a virus is considered a HPAIV if it has an intravenous pathogenicity
index (IVPI) in six-week old chickens of greater than 1.2, or causes at least 75% mortality in four to
eight-week old chickens when birds are infected intravenously. The virus is also considered a HPAIV
if there is a polybasic cleavage site in the HA segment; endogenous furin-like proteases activate the
HA at polybasic cleavage sites to facilitate a systemic, and often fatal, infection. Only subtypes H5 and
H7 have displayed this phenotype in natural isolates. Absence of a polybasic cleavage site within the
HA classifies the virus as being LPAIV [11,12]. However, the presence of a di- or tri-basic cleavage
site in the HA gene can also lead to enhanced pathogenicity [13]. LPAIV typically causes milder
clinical disease in poultry, often associated with a fall in production measures (commonly a drop in
egg production with abnormal eggs), with high morbidity (>50%) and low mortality (<5%) [14,15].
However, in some cases of LPAIV infection mortality can increase, especially in instances of concurrent
or secondary infection with other diseases [14,16].
GloballyH6Nxviruses are becoming an increasingly persistent burden for the poultry industry [17],
with frequent introductions incurring large scale disease. H6Nx viruses also boast the most extensive
host species range compared to other subtypes [18], and recent evidence, explored in this review,
suggests that H6Nx viruses harbour several molecular signatures indicative of mammalian adaptation
therefore posing a potential risk to human health. This review aims to summarise the global distribution,
evolution, host tropism infectivity and transmissibility and human health risk posed by H6Nx AIVs.
2. History and Emergence of H6Nx Viruses
2.1. History of H6Nx Isolation and Detection
The H6 subtype has been isolated from wild aquatic, domestic aquatic and terrestrial avian
species throughout the world. Whilst the first detection of H6 subtype AIVs is widely regarded
in literature as being from a turkey in Massachusetts, United States of America (USA) in 1965
(A/turkey/Massachusetts/3740/1965 (H6N2)), the oldest sequenced isolate is from Canada in 1963
(A/turkey/Canada/63 (H6N2)) [17,19,20]. Thereafter, LPAI H6Nx viruses were reported in Taiwan in
1972; Australia, USA and Canada around 1974, and Hong Kong in 1977 [17].
2.2. Species and Geographical Distribution of H6Nx Viruses
H6 AIVs a↵ect both domestic poultry and wild birds. H6Nx infections have caused sustained
poultry infections (ducks and chickens) and circulate in live bird markets (LBMs) in China. Surveillance
indicates that H6 viruses have become enzootic in domestic ducks of southern China, mostly as
H6N6 viruses. An 8-year surveillance study (1998–2006), that included more than 36,000 wild birds
from Europe and the Americas, found that H6 was the most abundantly detected influenza virus
subtype [18]. H6Nx viruses now boast the broadest host range compared to any other subtype [18].
H6Nx viruses are globally distributed (Figure 1) and have been isolated and sequenced with
increasing frequency from domestic poultry, wild birds and several mammalian species including dogs
and a single case in humans (Table 1) [21].
2.3. Global Surveillance of H6Nx Viruses
Global surveillance of LPAIVs, including H6Nx, is typically poor. LPAIV are never considered
notifiable viruses in poultry and cause relatively few overt human infections, therefore, infections are
not often investigated in detail. In many resource-limited regions, surveillance is not performed or
performed only sporadically. LPAIV are only generally reported through research publications, genome
announcements or WHO reports (in the case of confirmed human cases), and not via governmental
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surveillance. Therefore, it is highly likely that H6Nx viruses are present in far more countries than
reported, including in low income regions not identified in Table 1.
Figure 1. Countries that have sequenced H6Nx Avian Influenza Viruses (AIVs). All sequenced H6
viruses currently available on www.fludb.org were used to produce this figure. The maps correspond
as follows: 1 = H6N1, 2 = H6N2, 3 = H6N3, 4 = H6N4, 5 = H6N5, 6 = H6N6, 7= H6N7, 8 = H6N8 and
9 = H6N9. Figure produced using www.mapchart.net.
Table 1. All H6 haemagglutinin (HA) sequences currently available on www.fludb.org with the
corresponding years of detection and sampling source.
Country Period Subtype Species No. of Sequenced Strains Total
Antarctica 2011 H6N8 Brown Skua, Chinstrap Penguin 2 2
Argentina
2007–2011 H6N2
Silver Teal, Comb Duck,
Rosy-Billed Pochard,
Yellow-Billed Pintail
7
9
2007 H6N8 Rosy-Billed Pochard 2
Australia
1979 H6N1 Pacific Duck, Gray Teal 3
81979 H6N2 Eurasian Coot 1
1972–1980 H6N5 Pacific Black Duck, Shearwater, 4
Bangladesh 2015 H6N1 Duck (unspecified) 1 2
2016 H6N2 Mallard 1
Belgium
2008–2010 H6N1 European Herring Gull, Turkey 3
21
2011–2016 H6N2 Mute Swan, EurasianTeal, Mallard 5
2009 H6N5 Mallard 1
2010–2016 H6N8 Mallard, Ruddy turnstone, TuftedDuck, Coot, Duck (unspecified) 12
Brazil 2012 H6N1 White-Rumped Sandpiper 6 6
Bulgaria
2008–2010 H6N2 Mule Duck 12
142010 H6N5 Mule Duck 1
2010 H6N8 Mule Duck 1
Canada
1981–2010 H6N1 Mallard, Blue Winged teal,Green-Winged Teal 10
88
1978–2005 H6N2
Mallard, Pintail Duc, Shoveler
Duck, Turkey, Blue-Winged Teal,
Common Coot
47
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Table 1. Cont.
Country Period Subtype Species No. of Sequenced Strains Total
1985–1990 H6N3 Mallard, Pintail Duck 8
1979–1989 H6N4 Mallard, Pintail Duck,Blue-Winged Teal 3
1978–2003 H6N5 Mallard, Pintail Duck,Blue-Winged Teal 12
1982–2010 H6N6
Mallard, Pintail Duck,
Blue-Winged Teal, Widgeon,
American Black Duck
6
1978–1996 H6N8
Mallard, Pintail Duck,
Blue-Winged Teal, Redhead,
Turkey, Green-Winged Teal
40
Chile
2016 H6N2 Franklin’s gull, Kelp Gull 3
6
2016–2017 H6N8 Upland Goose, Mallard, Kelp Gull 3
China
1997–2017 H6N1
Bean Goose, Chicken, Chukar,
Duck (unspecified), guineafowl,
Mallard, Partridge, Pheasant,
Quail, Shoveler Duck, Common
Teal, Turkey
109
937
2000–2017 H6N2
Wild Bird (unspecified), Chicken,
Chukar, Duck (unspecified),
Environmental sample, Bean
Goose, Goose (unspecified),
Guineafowl, Mallard, Partridge,
Pheasant, Pigeon, quail, Common
Teal, Turkey
462
2003–2017 H6N5 Duck (Unspecified), Mallard,Shoveler Duck 11
2004–2016 H6N6
Chicken, Duck (unspecified),
Environmental Sample, Goose
(unspecified), Mallard, Muscovy
Duck, Pigeon, Turtledove, Swine
321
2000–2016 H6N8
Wild Bird (unspecified), Duck
(unspecified), Environmental
sample, Goose (unspecified),
Mallard, Common Teal,
Wild Duck
32
2001–2007 H6N9 Duck (unspecified), wild Duck 2
Czech
Republic
2009 H6N2 Mallard 3
82007 H6N5 Mallard 2
2009–2010 H6N9 Mallard 3
Finland
2007 H6N5 Mallard 1
2
2007 H6N8 Mallard 1
France
1997–2010 H6N1 Turkey, Muscovy Duck 5
222000–2005 H6N2 Pekin duck, Turkey, Mallard 15
2001 H6N8 Turkey 2
Georgia
2015 H6N1 Mallard 1
42010–2015 H6N2 Mallard, Common Coot, DomesticDuck 3
Germany
1968–1999 H6N1 Turkey, Duck (unspecified) 2
91999–2002 H6N2 Turkey 6
1998 H6N5 Turkey 1
Guatemala 2013 H6N2 Blue-Winged Teal 2 2
Hong Kong
1976–2003 H6N1
Chicken, Chukar, Duck
(unspecified), Guineafowl,
Pheasant, Pigeon, Quail, Common
Teal, Waterfowl
38
69
1977–2002 H6N2
Duck (unspecified), Goose
(unspecified), Guineafowl, Quail,
Silky Chicken
19
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Table 1. Cont.
Country Period Subtype Species No. of Sequenced Strains Total
1977–2001 H6N4 Chicken, Goose (unspecified),Pheasant, Quail 5
1976–1980 H6N5 Duck (unspecified) 2
1997 H6N7 Goose (unspecified) 1
1977 H6N8 Duck (unspecified) 1
1977–1997 H6N9 Duck (unspecified), Goose(unspecified) 3
Iceland
2011 H6N5 Greylag Goose 3
12
2011 H6N8 Greylag Goose, Pink-footed Goose 9
India 2014–2015 H6N2 Duck (unspecified) 2 2
Israel 2001 H6N2 Wild Bird (unspecified) 2 2
Japan
2004–2017 H6N1 Chicken, Duck (unspecified) 12
44
2000–2017 H6N2 Duck (unspecified) 15
1980 H6N3 Gull (unspecified) 1
2006–2008 H6N5 Duck (unspecified), WildBird (unspecified) 5
2014 H6N6 Wild Bird (unspecified) 1
1996–2017 H6N8
Mallard, Wild Bird (unspecified),
Whooper Swan,
Duck (unspecified)
8
2001–2008 H6N9 Duck (unspecified),Swan (unspecified) 2
Mexico
2008 H6N1 Northern Shoveler,Green-Winged Teal 2
42007 H6N2 Mallard 1
2009 H6N5 Green-Winged Teal 1
Mongolia 2011 H6N6 Common Teal 1 1
Netherlands
1999–2012 H6N1
Chicken, Eurasian Teal, Eurasian
Wigeon, Greater White-Fronted
Goose, Greylag Goose, Mallard,
Common Teal
28
128
2000–2014 H6N2
Barnacle Goose, Bewick’s Swan,
Gadwall Duck, Eurasian Wigeon,
Greater White-Fronted Goose,
White-Fronted Goose, Greylag
Goose, Mallard, Common Teal
36
2011 H6N4 Mallard 2
1999–2015 H6N5 Greater white-fronted Goose,Mallard, Turkey 9
2004–2014 H6N8
Barnacle Goose, Bewick’s Swan,
Black-Headed Gull, Greater
White-Fronted Goose, Bean Goose,
White-Fronted Goose, Mallard,
Common Teal
53
New Zealand
2005 H6N2 Mallard 1
2
2005 H6N9 Mallard 1
Norway
2005–2010 H6N2 Mallard, Teal (unspecified) 13
14
2009 H6N8 Mew Gull 1
Peru 2010 H6N8 Egret, Sandpiper 2 2
Portugal 2006 H6N7 1 1
Russia
2006–2009 H6N1 Duck (unspecified), Teal(unspecified), Herring Gull 6
92006–2011 H6N2 Mallard, Gull (unspecified) 2
2009 H6N6 Teal (unspecified) 1
South Africa
2009 H6N1 Ostrich 1
212002–2019 H6N2 Chicken 18
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Table 1. Cont.
Country Period Subtype Species No. of Sequenced Strains Total
1998–2007 H6N8 Ostrich 2
South Korea
2003–2017 H6N1
Wild Bird (unspecified), Duck
(unspecified), Spot-Billed Duck,
White Pekin Duck, Bean Goose,
Mallard, Shorebird (unspecified)
19
64
2002–2017 H6N2
Wild Bird (unspecified), Duck
(unspecified), Spot-Billed Duck,
White Pekin Duck, White-Fronted
Goose, Mallard
35
2005–2018 H6N5
Wild Bird (unspecified), Duck
(unspecified), Bean
Goose, Mallard
5
2005–2014 H6N8 Wild Bird (unspecified),Spot-Billed Duck, Mallard 5
Spain
2007 H6N5 Mallard 1
3
2006 H6N8 Duck (unspecified) 2
Sweden
2002–2005 H6N1 Mallard 4
482000–2009 H6N2
Guillemot, Mallard,
Eurasian Wigeon 38
2014 H6N4 Mallard 1
2005 H6N8 Mallard 5
Taiwan
1972–2014 H6N1 Chicken, Dog, Duck (unspecified),Partridge, Human 78
822004 H6N2 Duck (unspecified) 1
1989–2004 H6N5 Chicken, Shorebird (unspecified) 3
Thailand 2005 H6N1 Duck (unspecified) 1 1
Ukraine 2010 H6N1 White-Fronted Goose 1 1
USA
1976–2018 H6N1
American Black Duck, America
Green-Winged Teal, American
Wigeon, Wild Bird (unspecified),
Environmental Sample,
Blue-Winged Teal, Canada Goose,
Common Goldeneye, Duck
(unspecified), Long-Tailed Duck,
Gadwall Duck, Eurasian Teal,
Glaucous Gull, Cackling Goose,
Greater White-Fronted Goose,
Greater Scaup, Goose
(unspecified), gull (unspecified),
Hawk, Laughing Gull, Lesser
Scaup, Mallard, Mottled Duck,
Northern Pintail, Northern
Shoveler Duck, Ring-Necked
Duck, Ruddy Turnstone,
Sanderling, Sandpiper, Shorebird
(unspecified), Snow Goose,
Steller’s Eider, Turkey,
White-Fronted Goose
349
962
1986–2015 H6N2
American Black Duck, America
Green-Winged Teal, American
Wigeon, Wild Bird (unspecified),
Black Duck, Environmental
Sample, Blue-Winged Teal,
Chicken, Cinnamon Teal, Duck
(unspecified), Gadwall Duck,
Eurasian Teal, Greater
White-Fronted Goose, Herring
Gull, Goose (unspecified),
Japanese Quail, Laughing Gull,
Mallard, Mottled Duck, Northern
Pintail, Northern Shoveler Duck,
Pintail, Quail, Redhead, Ruddy
Turnstone, Shorebird
(unspecified), Turkey
244
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Table 1. Cont.
Country Period Subtype Species No. of Sequenced Strains Total
1989–2009 H6N3 Chicken, Herring Gull, LaughingGull, Mallard 7
1982–2016 H6N4
Environmental Sample, Gull
(unspecified), Laughing Gull,
Mallard, Northern Pintail, Ruddy
Turnstone, Sanderling, Shorebird
32
1975–2015 H6N5
American Black Duck, America
Green-Winged Teal, American
Wigeon, Blue-Winged Teal,
Chicken, Duck (unspecified),
Environmental Sample,
Green-Winged Teal, Mallard,
Northern Pintail, Pintail, Red
Knot, Ruddy Turnstone, Turkey
58
1980–2018 H6N6
American Wigeon, Blue-Winged
Teal, Duck (unspecified),
Green-Winged Teal, Mallard,
Northern Pintail, Ruddy
Turnstone, Sanderling, Turkey
31
2000–2018 H6N7
American Green-Winged Teal,
Blue-Winged Teal, Mallard,
Ruddy Turnstone
5
1977–2016 H6N8
American Black Duck, America
Green-Winged Teal, American
Wigeon, Wild Bird (unspecified),
Black Duck, Blue-Winged Teal,
Bu✏ehead, Canada Goose,
Chicken, Duck (unspecified),
Domestic Duck, Wood Duck,
Environmental Sample, Eurasian
Teal, Ross’s Goose, Herring Gull,
Knot, Laughing Gull, Lesser
Scaup, Mallard, Northern Pintail,
Northern Shoveler, Pintail,
Ring-Necked Duck, Ruddy
Turnstone, Shorebird
(unspecified), Shoveler, Turkey
198
1975–2014 H6N9
Duck (unspecified), Long-Tailed
Duck, Green-Winged
Teal, Mallard
4
Vietnam
2013–2018 H6N1 Chicken, Duck (unspecified),Muscovy Duck 6
174
2007–2014 H6N2
Duck (unspecified),
Environmental Samples, Mallard,
Muscovy Duck
40
2010–2018 H6N6
Chicken, Duck (unspecified),
Environmental Samples, Mallard,
Muscovy Duck
124
2013–2014 H6N8 Duck (unspecified), Mallard 2
2011 H6N9 Duck (unspecified) 1
Zambia 2008 H6N2 Duck (unspecified) 4 4
3. Genomic Sequence Availability, Phylogenetics and Nomenclature
3.1. Availability of Sequence Data
As of 7 February 2020, 2501 full or majority partial (>70% of segment length) HA sequences were
publicly available on FluDB (www.fludb.org). Most sequences are from Asia (55%, n = 1372), of which
76% (n = 1039) were sampled in China. Only 2% of sequences were sampled in South or Central
America or Africa (n = 56) (Figure 2A), which may partly or wholly reflect lower surveillance and
sequencing capacity in these regions. Increasing sequencing in these regions for H6 and other AIVs is
important, particularly given projected regional intensification in the poultry industry [22].
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Figure 2. (A) Number of H6Nx sequences sampled in each country, (B) number of di↵erent H6Nx
subtypes captured by available sequences. The countries represented in grey indicate no reported H6
HA sequence submissions.
Subtype diversity of available sequenced strains is correspondingly higher in well-sampled
regions (Figures 2B and 3B), so absence of a sequenced subtype cannot be considered representative
of true absence of that subtype in poorly-sampled regions. Nevertheless, the genetic sequence data
available suggest that di↵erent NA subtypes of H6 AIV may be di↵erentially prevalent across di↵erent
hosts and countries (Figure 3). The apparent absence of whole genome sequences from H6N7, H6N8
and H6N9 in chickens (Figure 3A) and H6N3 in China is unusual, given the large numbers of sequences
sampled from these groups. Whether this is caused by biased sampling, or by biological factors, should
be investigated in greater detail.
3.2. Phylogenetics
Phylogenetic analyses of available sequence data have demonstrated that H6 HA sequence
diversity is highly spatially structured, such that sequences sampled from the same country or
continent tend to cluster together within the phylogenetic tree [23,24] (Figure 4). This is consistent
with H6 viral movement in wild birds being concentrated within continental flyways, as has been
previously reported, and is mixed and distributed globally [25]. Phylogenetic trees indicate that H6Nx
reassorts extensively with AIVs of diverse NA and internal gene lineages (NA diversity indicated on
Figure S1 [17,26].
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Figure 3. (A) H6Nx sequences by genera and subtype, for those subtypes where neuraminidase (NA)
is known. (B) Sequences by country and subtype, for those subtypes where NA is known.
Figure 4. A representative phylogeny of currently available H6 HA sequences available on www.fludb.
orgAllHAH6 sequenceswith>70% segment length (>1222 bp)were downloaded fromFluDB (7/2/2020),
with flagged sequences removed. The dataset was downsampled to select a maximum of five sequences
from each year from each country, and commonly used lineage-defining sequences were included.
MAAFT [27] was used to align the segments. A phylogeny was estimated using RAXML, using the
best-fit GTR+G+I model as identified using modeltest-ng [28]. A total of 100 bootstraps replicate trees
were constructed. Where specific clades in each named group was inconsistent between publications
(e.g., HN573-like viruses), or lineages are identified in only one publication, specific publications are
highlighted. Tips are coloured by location, and node size indicates bootstrap support for each node.
Phylogenetic position of sequences used commonly to define lineages are given with stars. The most
commonly used lineage nomenclature is highlighted in bold font.
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3.3. Nomenclature
All AIVs have evolved into distinct lineages, typically characterised by geographical distribution.
However, the rapid evolution and persistence of the H5 haemagglutinin (HA) derived from the
A/goose/Guangdong/1996 H5N1 strain prompted the development of a standard clade nomenclature
system, established by the WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group. Phylogenetic analysis
of H5 HA genes characterises sequences into clades based upon sequence homology and specific
clade definition criteria. The nomenclature system is relatively fluid; as viruses within clades
continue to evolve, new sub-lineages periodically emerge until the specific clade definition criteria
are met, where they are then designated as separate clades [29]. Clades are defined through the
sharing of a common (clade-defining) node in the phylogenetic tree; monophyletic grouping with a
bootstrap value of  60 at the clade-defining node (after 1000 neighbour-joining bootstrap replicates);
and average percentage pairwise nucleotide distances between and within clades of >1.5% and <1.5%,
respectively [29].
There is no universally accepted or formal nomenclature system for H6 viruses, and those
clades that have been widely recognised are loosely defined. The HA H6 segment can be initially
phylogenetically divided at the root into Lineage A (sometimes termed “North American Lineage”) [21]
that encompasses strains from North America and Oceania, and a Lineage B (“Eurasian Lineage”) that
includes strains from all continental regions [30]. Several well-supported clades within Lineage B
are widely recognised (bold text, Figure 4). Despite this, there is poor consistency between studies in
exactly which phylogenetic nodes are basal to clades. Most notably, the term “HN573-like” viruses
may refer to either a major clade [24], or instead to variously sized smaller sub-clades [23,31] (Figure 4).
ST339-like viruses and ST2853-like viruses have both been interchangeably termed Group I and Group
II (e.g., [17,23]). In addition, several well-supported clades have been identified and named within the
literature, for example South African sub-lineages I and II (Figure 4) [32–34]. Sporadic and conflicting
use of clade nomenclature between studies complicates scientific discussion of H6 evolution and
diversity. To our knowledge, there has been only one attempt to propose a single global nomenclature,
which analysed non-redundant H6 HA sequences between 2000 and 2014 [17]. Whilst the authors
identified major clades Group I (mainly composed of H6N2 and H6N6 viruses from Asia) and Group
II (which mostly consists of H6N1 and H6N2 viruses from Asia and around the world) and a single
subdivision within one clade, the lack of a quantitative method for selecting named clades mean that
the utility of this classification is limited.
The lack of nomenclature, or the essential requirement for one may be the result of a lack of
available sequences for H6 viruses and a low rate of poultry outbreaks compared to other subtypes.
Unlike H5 viruses, H6 viruses are not listed as a notifiable disease by the OIE, which may contribute to
the lack of sequence availability and have a significantly lower incidence of human infections [12,35].
Additionally, despite persistence in wild bird populations, the predominant AIVs which are responsible
for large-scale morbidity and mortality in poultry populations, H5, H7 and H9 subtypes, are prioritised
in control strategies over H6 viruses. The increase in awareness, surveillance and reporting of H6
viruses may increase the availability of sequences which can be utilised to potentially establish a robust
nomenclature system to monitor the evolution of these viruses. A single H6 nomenclature with clear
classificatory guidelines should be proposed and adopted.
3.4. Molecular Epidemiology and Virus Evolution
Whilst the molecular epidemiology of H6Nx viruses has not been analysed in depth at a global
scale, small scale regional analysis has been conducted.
Antigenic analyses of H6 influenza viruses isolated in south-eastern China between 1975–1981
and 1997–2000 has identified two antigenically distinct groups that continue to circulate in poultry [36].
Evolutionary genetic analysis of these viruses suggests that H6N1 viruses from south-eastern China
have become adapted to terrestrial poultry [36,37]. It is suggested that these terrestrial 1999 and
2000 A/teal/Hong Kong/W312/97 (H6N1)-like viruses, along with co-circulating H9N2 viruses, could
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have been involved in the genesis of pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses in 1997 that have caused
substantial human infection [38].
4. H6Nx Viruses in Avian Species
4.1. Domestic Poultry Infections with H6Nx Viruses
H6 AIVs have been one of the predominant subtypes circulating since the 1970s in live bird
markets (LBMs) in southern China and later South Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos,
and caused significant morbidity in domestic poultry. Domestic poultry can be defined as including
chickens, turkeys, geese and ducks, that are raised for the production of meat or eggs. H6 continues to
circulate in LBMs and is prevalent in several countries (Figure 5).
1 
 
 
Figure 5. (A) A map indicating global H6Nx sequences reported in chickens. (B) A map showing the
density of the number of di↵erent H6Nx subtypes in chickens. Most, if not all, chickens with reported
AIV infections are domestic birds. Ducks, geese and turkeys have been excluded as there is no way to
distinguish between whether they are of a domestic of wild nature.
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In the East Asian sub-region, H6N1, H6N2, H6N5, H6N6, H6N8 and H6N9 co-circulate in chicken
and duck populations, undergoing frequent reassortment with other subtypes [23,39,40]. Themigratory
waterfowl reservoir is themost common source of H6 introduction into domestic poultry but is typically
restricted in their ability to spread further [33]. H6 viruses typically cause asymptomatic infections
in waterfowl but infection of chickens with H6 viruses are often associated with reduced egg yield,
upper respiratory tract infection, morbidity and increased mortality [20]. Between February 2000 and
February 2002, the California Animal Health and Food Safety Laboratory System diagnosed 26 cases of
low-pathogenic H6N2 avian influenza from 12 commercial egg-laying farms (North American Lineage
A, Figure 4) [41]. Clinical signs of H6N2 in layers range from nearly inapparent to relatively severe
respiratory signs with egg yield reductions up to 30%. Weekly mortality increases between 1.6 and
5.1-fold with severe losses in broiler breeders reporting production losses up to 60% with further
mortalities of up to 37% [33]. Some histological features present in chickens infected with H6N2 are
fibrinous yolk peritonitis, salpingitis, oophoritis, nephritis and swollen kidneys [41].
4.2. H6Nx Infections in Avian Species in East and Southeast Asia
4.2.1. Domestic Poultry
Southern China has been considered a hypothetical epicentre for facilitating the emergence
of pandemic influenza viruses, with increasing diversity of the influenza ecology in the last
two decades [42,43]. Surveillance in southern China from 2000 to 2005 indicated that H6 viruses were
prevalent year-round in terrestrial poultry [44]. The earliest recorded isolates on FluDB from domestic
poultry in Asia for ducks, is from Taiwan in 1972 (A/duck/Taiwan/0526/72 (H6N1)) [45] and for chickens,
is from Hong Kong in 1977 (A/chicken/Hong Kong/17/1977 (H6N1)). However, due to the limited
number of sequences available at the time, robust phylogeny and the identification of reassortants
is extremely di cult to identify. Since 1972, infection with H6N1 LPAIV has also been prevalent in
domestic poultry in Taiwan [46]. This is largely due to the preferred method of poultry trade in East
and Southeast Asia. LBMs are a traditional component to poultry trading systems whereby live birds,
which often includes chickens, ducks, quail and pigeons, are bought together in a single location from
various di↵erent sources to ‘change hands’ or to be slaughtered. As a consequence, LBMs facilitate
mixing of infected and non-infected birds which perpetuates the spread of AIV infection [20,41,46–48].
Domestic ducks are known to be particularly vulnerable to H6 AIV infections and more likely to
be the major reservoirs for H6Nx viruses [17], when compared with chickens and geese [49]. A total of
16% (1325/8325) of samples collected from apparently healthy poultry in Southern China from 2000 to
2005 identified as H6 positive; 68.8% from aquatic poultry including domestic ducks and geese, 31.2%
from minor poultry including partridges and quail, and a single isolate from chickens. H6N2 was
the most prevalent subtype among all H6 viruses (79%), followed by H6N1, H6N5 and H6N6 [23].
A second study 2 years later found that the dominant H6N2 was replaced with H6N6 [24].
Domestic ducks act as intermediate hosts between the gene pool from migratory ducks and
terrestrial poultry in the influenza virus ecosystem of this region [23,24]. Surveillance indicates that H6
viruses have become enzootic in the domestic ducks of southern China, mostly as H6N6 viruses [24].
Between 2011 and 2016, 11 surveys of AIV were performed in China that included almost the
entire Chinese mainland. Epidemiological data from the study showed that the positive rate of H6
subtype AIVs in China increased each year from 2012 to 2016 [50]. From the perspective of host birds,
the positive rates (from high to low) were geese (11.45%), ducks (3.81%), other poultry (0.57%), pigeons
(0.26%) and chickens (0.11%), which is largely consistent with previous research. The positive rate of
H6 AIVs in geese was significantly higher than it has been previously. This suggests that geese have
begun to play an important role in the ecological distribution of H6 AIVs.
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4.2.2. Wild Aquatic Birds
The H6 viruses are among the most frequently encountered subtype in both wild and aquatic birds
during surveillance programmes [23,24]. The majority of H6 duck isolates belonged to a distinct group
with a single gene constellation, primarily comprised of H6N2 viruses. The emergence of this novel
group was identified in Southern China, and cocirculates alongside viruses from the Eurasian natural
gene pool [22]. The emergence and presence of this single distinct group is largely contradictory to
other more recent surveillance studies in the region which have found a high diversity of isolated
viruses across multiple subtypes, which is typically achieved by reassortment events. However, both
opposing investigations identify the importance of both domestic ducks and wild aquatic avian species
in the persistence of H6Nx infections in the region, acting as part of the natural reservoir along with
wild aquatic birds but also as a major poultry type that harbours endemic virus lineages [23].
4.3. H6Nx Infections in Avian Species in Africa
4.3.1. Domestic Poultry
South Africa’s H6N2 epizootic in chickens began in 2001 but was traced to a progenitor originating
from a reassortment between viruses that infected commercial ostriches in the Western Cape Province
in the mid to late 1990s, notably an H6N8 and an H9N2 virus [33]. The virus likely derived its M,
NP, PB1 and PA genes from the H9N2 1995 ostrich virus A/Ostrich/South Africa/9508103 and the
H6N8 virus, (A/Ostrich/South Africa/KK98/98) isolated in 1998 [32]. H6N2 is a controlled disease
within South Africa and thus requires compulsory serological testing of registered compartmentalised
commercial poultry farms and operations with significant contributions from non-commercial poultry
flocks (e.g., backyard chickens) [33].
4.3.2. Wild Aquatic Birds
Egypt is situated on important migratory flyways for wild birds between di↵erent continents [51].
Birds intended for sale in LBMs for human consumption were sampled and a novel reassortant strain
of H6N2 was identified and isolated from a Eurasian Teal. This novel virus possesses a reassortant
pattern originating from di↵ering AIV gene pools. The complete genome sequence was obtained and
designated as (H6N2) A/Eurasian teal/Egypt/P2-29/2017 (EG/P2-29) [4].
During AIV surveillance in Zambia (2008–2009) H6N2 was isolated from wild waterfowl.
Phylogenetic analyses demonstrated that these viruses were of Eurasian lineage [52]. Some gene
segments were closely related to those of AIVs isolated in Europe and Asia, indicative of reassortment
and subsequent spread across continents. Analysis of the amino acid sequences of the internal genes
revealed that several isolates contained genes of similarity predominantly observed in human influenza
viruses [52].
4.4. H6Nx Infections in Avian Species in the UK and Europe
H6Nx viruses have also been obtained in both wild birds and commercial poultry flocks in Europe
throughout the 2000s. Since 2001, H6N2 circulated in meat turkey flocks in Germany and H6N1 in
infected meat turkeys was isolated in France [53,54].
In 2009 samples from birds at large commercial breeder farms in East and Southern England were
tested for LPAI and H6N1 isolates were obtained. More recently, two separate outbreaks of H6N1 in
commercial poultry have been detected in Northern Ireland and Scotland, respectively. H6N1 was
isolated from a commercial farm in County Fermanagh in January 2020, resulting in substantial culling,
following a previous reported case earlier in the month on a separate premise. In February 2020 a
Scottish free-range laying flock were found to have been infected with LPAI H6N1, likely to have been
contracted from wild birds. Further cases in Northern Ireland have occurred throughout February
and March 2020 and similar outbreaks have been identified since in the republic of Ireland, Scotland
and England.
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Several cases of low pathogenic avian influenza H6 were identified in laying and turkey farms
throughout the Netherlands between 2018 and 2019 [55]. Most cases were detected via monitoring
(serologically positive) and a single case identified based on clinical symptoms. The circulating viruses
appeared to be largely benign in poultry. The frequency of identification raises the question of whether
specific strains of H6Nx may be becoming more adapted to poultry.
4.5. H6Nx Infections in Avian Species in the Americas
Inter-hemispheric movement of AIV genes from Eurasia to America have repeatedly been
documented, with reverse movements less common [56]. This may be due to the high volume of
migratory bird movements from Eurasia to America, the incompatibility of the Eurasian IAV gene pool
with the introduced North American genes (or vice versa) or imbalanced viral surveillance monitoring.
As a result, the North American AIV gene pool has permissibly been replaced by the Eurasian lineage
within a decade of introduction [57].
4.5.1. Domestic Poultry
H6N2 has caused sustained outbreaks among domestic poultry in the USA from 2000 to
2005 [41,58,59]. H6N2 influenza viruses have been isolated from chickens in California whose
H6 genes do not fit into clearly defined North American lineages, which raised the question of whether
Eurasian viruses are in the process of spreading to North America [56] and would subsequently
cause reassortment. Between February 2000 and February 2002, the California Animal Health and
Food Safety Laboratory System diagnosed 26 cases of low-pathogenic H6N2 avian influenza from
12 commercial egg-laying farms [41].
The most common gross and histologic lesions observed in California in chickens infected with
H6N2 in 2000–2002, were fibrinous yolk peritonitis, salpingitis, oophoritis and nephritis. Oedema of
the mesentery of the oviduct and pale, swollen kidneys were also observed. Mortality in infected
flocks ranged from 0.25% to 3%, and egg production dropped 7% to 40%.
4.5.2. Wild Aquatic Birds
AIV genome sequences (n = 109) from ducks in the Atlantic flyway were analysed to determine
their genetic structure. The analyses included 25 AIVs from ducks from Newfoundland, Canada,
from 2008–2011 and 84 available reference duck AIVs from the Atlantic flyway from 2006–2011 [60].
Of these 109 genome sequences, three H6 HA gene sequences were identified. The three H6 genes
belonged to the lineage of Eurasian-avian origin, which is known to have become the predominant
H6 lineage in North America in the last decade [56,60]. In contrast to the extensive animal influenza
virus surveillance activities carried out in Southern China, East Asia, Northern Europe, Australia
and North America, there is very limited data available from South America. Influenza A viruses
from wild waterfowl in South America were rarely isolated and/or characterised. To explore the
ecology of influenza A viruses in this region, a long-term surveillance program was established in 2006
for resident and migratory water birds in Argentina—a partnership between the National Institute
of Agricultural Technology (INTA), the Argentinean National Animal Health Service (SENASA),
the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and the University of Maryland, College Park, in the United
States. AIV surveillance is carried out for resident and migratory water birds, seabirds and shorebirds
along the Argentine Atlantic coast and in freshwater wetlands formed by two of the major river systems
in South America, the Paraná and Uruguay rivers [30]. Surveillance e↵orts are aimed at generating
epidemiological data for an early warning of the introduction of AIV into commercial poultry.
H6 AIVs were isolated from hunter-killed ducks during the hunting seasons of 2007 and 2010.
Specifically, rosy-billed pochards (Netta peposaca) in the Argentine wetlands were investigated and
compared to prototypic H6 strains from North America and Eurasia. Of the five H6 isolates obtained,
three were H6N2 subtypes and two H6N8 subtypes.
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Analysis suggests the existence of an H6 South American lineage in which viruses do not appear
to be mixing with and are evolving independently from influenza viruses in other latitudes [30].
One of the HA genes appears to have derived from a virus of North American lineage, indicating the
presence of more than one H6 subtype cluster. Studies also suggest limited poultry adaptation and that
additional molecular changes would be required for these viruses to replicate and transmit e ciently
in chickens.
5. H6Nx Viruses in Mammalian Species and Zoonotic Infection
Most HPAIV or LPAIV infections in humans and other mammals have been associated with
direct or indirect contact with infected live poultry or infected poultry products such as carcasses [61].
There has been no reliable evidence to suggest that the influenza viruses of avian origin are able
to consistently or e↵ectively transmit between mammals or humans following initial zoonotic
spillover [61,62]. A prerequisite for AIVs to overcome the species barrier and become human-to-human
transmissible is largely dependent on the HA and PB2 proteins. Human-to-human transmissible
viruses should preferentially bind to ↵-2,6 sialic acid cell surface receptors, be able to withstand
the harsh microenvironment of respiratory droplets and mammalian nasal tract, and be able to
replicate e ciently in mammalian cells [63–65]. To date, naturally occurring H6 viruses have shown
varied ability to bind to ↵-2,6 sialic acid receptors and a distinct lack of the PB2 E627K substitution,
suggesting further mutation and/or reassortment is required for human-transmissible H6 viruses to
occur; however, spillover events into mammals can and do occur [20,66].
Very little is known about the replicative capacity, immunogenicity, and correlates of protective
immunity for low-pathogenicity H6 influenza viruses in mammals. H6 AIVs have been isolated from
humans, pigs and a dog [67]. H6N2 along with H6N6 are viruses that are found to also replicate in
mice without preadaptation, and some have acquired the ability to bind to human-like receptors [20].
5.1. Human Infections with H6Nx Viruses
On 21 June 2013, the first case of a human infection by an avian-origin H6N1 influenza A virus
(A/Taiwan/2/2013, Taiwan2) was reported by the Taiwan Centres for Disease Control [21]. The Taiwan2
isolate was highly homologous to currently circulating chicken H6N1 viruses in Taiwan and had been
generated as a result of interclade reassortment. The virus was also identified as LPAI due to the
HA1/HA2 connecting peptide region (QIATR/GIF), lacking the multibasic amino acids.
Although the Taiwan2 infection was the first confirmed human case, H6-specific antibodies
had been previously detected in personnel working in Chinese live-animal markets as well as U.S.
veterinarians exposed to birds [68]. A total of 2124 serum samples, obtained from 1407 poultry
workers from seven di↵erent areas of China between 2014 and 2016, were tested by haemagglutination
inhibition and microneutralisation assays. Seroprevalence for H6Nx subtypes ranged from 0.4% to
2.5% [69]. Serological surveys conducted in both China and North America indicated that H6 influenza
viruses might have previously infected swine and humans [68,70], and one-third of human volunteers
inoculated with H6N1 or H6N2 viruses showed mild clinical symptoms with virus shedding [71].
The A/teal/Hong Kong/W312/97 (H6N1) and the human H5N1 and H9N2 influenza viruses
possess similar genes encoding internal proteins, suggesting that H6N1 viruses could become novel
human pathogens [36]. This A/teal/Hong Kong (HK)/W312/97 (H6N1) influenza virus is the first known
isolate with seven A/HK/156/97 (H5N1)-like gene segments [36]. The A/teal/HK/W312/97 (H6N1) virus
possesses not only these six internal protein genes but also the N1 neuraminidase (NA) gene of the
human H5N1 influenza virus. This virus essentially represents the re-emergence of the H5N1 influenza
viruses with a di↵erent hemagglutinin (HA) [72].
Though there is no evidence of inter-human transmission, the frequency at which humans
appear to become infected raises the concern that avian H6 viruses may initiate human epidemics,
if transmissibility between humans is gained.
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5.2. H6Nx Studies in Laboratory Animals
Mice are a convenient and relatively cheapmodel in which to study of themechanisms of influenza
virus pathogenesis and human polymerase adaptation. H6Nx viruses are able to infect and replicate in
mice without prior adaptation [20,73]. A specific example being reassortants between H6N2 and H6N6,
two subtypes coexisting in LBMs in several provinces of Southern China. These viruses have a nity
for human-like receptors and are also able to transmit between guinea pigs by direct contact [74].
Mouse infection studies conducted by Gillam Ross et al., with 14 di↵erent H6Nx viruses of
North American and Eurasian lineage, showed that multiple viruses replicated in lungs of mice,
causing varied degrees of morbidity and mortality [75]. However, the di↵erent H6Nx lineage viruses
induced similar patterns of neutralising antibody responses. In general, neutralising antibodies from
di↵erent H6 virus-infected mice were not capable of cross-reactivity between the di↵erent H6Nx
lineages. However, a single H6 virus (A/teal/Hong Kong/312/97) was identified that induced protective
immunity against viruses in the North American and Eurasian lineages [75]. This particular virus was
identified as a potential precursor to the Hong Kong-origin H5N1 viruses isolated during the 1997
H5N1 outbreak in humans [72].
Ferrets are widely used animal models of human influenza, justified by the similar distribution
of SA receptors in the upper respiratory tract to humans. They also exhibit similar clinical signs
when infected with influenza [76–79]. Unlike for other zoonotic avian influenza subtypes, such as
H5N1 [80], formal risk assessments based on ferret experimentation are not publicly available for H6Nx
viruses. However, several ferret experiments for H6Nx infections have been conducted. In China,
in recent years, frequent reassortments between influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and other endemic SIVs
have been observed. The internal genes of the influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 virus, which is prevalent in
swine worldwide, increases the replication e ciency of H6N6 IAV in the lower respiratory tract of
ferrets but not its transmissibility between ferrets. Experiments have shown that the virus has limited
transmissibility through direct contact or through inhalation of infectious aerosolised droplets [81].
The aims of the study conducted by Sun et al. were to understand the impacts of mutations in HA of the
endemic H6N6 virus on its receptor-binding properties and also to assess the transmission potential and
potential risks posed by reassortants of H6N6 with the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. Such reassortants have
the potential to emerge naturally due to both viruses currently circulating in the swine population [82].
These findings suggest H6N6 swine IAV (SIV) currently poses a moderate risk to public health, but its
evolution and spread should be closely monitored.
5.3. Canine Infection with H6Nx Viruses
A chimeric 1918 pandemic influenza virus expressing a contemporary H6 HA caused enhanced
disease in mammals when compared to the chimeric virus alone, and inoculation of an avian H6N1
virus into dogs led to fever and detectable viruses in the lung [45].
Lin et al. [82] studied the prevalence of IAVs in dogs in Taiwan and identified
A/canine/Taiwan/E01/2014 (E01/14). Molecular analysis indicates that this isolate is closely related to
current avian H6N1 viruses circulating in Taiwan and harbours the E627K polymorphism in the PB2
protein. This polymorphism increases viral ability to replicate in mammalian species [82]. Phylogenetic
analysis of the HA and NA gene segments confirmed that E01/14 belongs to the H6N1 lineage that
has been circulating in chickens in Taiwan since 1997. Although the lineage of internal gene segments
(PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M and NS) is composed mainly of H6N1 subtype viruses isolated in Taiwan, some
H5N2 subtype isolates in the H6N1 lineage were observed [82].
5.4. H6Nx Virus Infections in Swine
The introduction of H6 AIVs from the natural reservoir into domestic poultry or mammals
other than humans including pigs are typically through direct contact with the infected wild birds or
indirectly through viral shedding into the environment via faeces and respiratory secretions [8]. Pigs
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play an important role in AIV infection and were proposed to be the “mixing-vessel” for the emergence
of novel pandemic AIVs which were observed in 1957, 1968 and 2009, acting as an intermediate host
for zoonotic transmission [8].
In 2010, a H6N6 virus emerged in southern China, and since then, has caused sporadic infections
among swine, with the virus binding to both ↵2,6 (human-like) and ↵2,3 (avian-like) sialic acids [81].
6. Adaptation and Mutations in H6Nx Viruses
6.1. Mammalian Adaptation of H6Nx Viruses
Upon infecting a new host, the virus must successfully bind to, enter and replicate in the host cell
as well as evade the innate immune response long enough for egress and subsequent transmission to a
new host. Therefore, all these factors are essential in adaptation to a new host species. Several H6Nx
viruses possess genetic substitutions that allow the virus to better bind to human receptors, replicate in
human cells and better evade the human immune response (Table 2).
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6.1.1. Receptor Preference
The host adaptation of influenza virus is partly dependent on the sialic acid isoform bound by
the viral HA. AIVs preferentially bind to sulphated or non-sulphated ↵2,3 isoform whereas human
influenza viruses preferentially bind to the ↵2,6 isoform [65,86,87]. The receptor-binding specificity
of influenza A viruses is also a major determinant for the host tropism of the virus, which enables
interspecies transmission. H6Nx viruses have di↵erent propensities to bind ↵2,3 or ↵2,6 SA depending
on the lineage.
Tzarumet al. [88] investigated the receptor specificity of the Taiwan2 humanH6HAusing synthetic
glycans and analysed the HA crystal structure. The Taiwan2 HA contains a unique combination of
key residues in the HA receptor binding site when compared to avian origin H6 AIVs, which have
never been observed in human or avian influenza viruses prior. Although amino acid residues 190V
and 228S were thought to potentially promote human receptor binding, Tzarum et al. concluded that
additional mutations may be required to change the binding specificity from ↵2,3 or ↵2,6 SA [88].
Further analysis of the human Taiwan2 H6N1 virus found that a single G225D mutation was able to
alter the receptor preference from ↵2,3 to ↵2,6 SA [89].
6.1.2. HA Mutations
The E190V and G228S mutations in the HA protein, as well as the frequent genetic reassortment of
the H6 AIVs with zoonotic strains (e.g., H5N6), may increase a nity for the human-type receptor [61],
which would pose an increasing threat to public health. Therefore, constant surveillance of AIVs in
China, where multiple zoonotic strains are known to have originated, is needed to understand the
evolution and dynamic reassortment of AIVs.
Using a panel of H6N1 viruses, Wang et al. demonstrated that the propensity of H6N1 viruses
isolated from Southern China, to bind to human receptors, has increased between 1972 and 2013 [90,91].
By possessing mutations at the following positions, L186/V190/Q226/S228, there is an increase in
human receptor binding a nity [66]. Mutagenesis work revealed that E190V and G228S substitutions
are crucially important to acquire the human receptor-binding capacity, while the P186L substitution
reduces the binding to ↵2,3 receptors [90].
Additionally, E190G produces a dual ↵2,3/↵2,6 receptor binding phenotype with double
E190D/G225D mutants having reduced binding to both ↵2,3 and ↵2,6 [92]. Approximately 34%
of H6 viruses circulating in China have enhanced a nity to human-like receptors [20,89,93].
6.1.3. NA Mutations
In a study conducted by Li et al. all N2, N3 isolates and 89.7% (n = 148) of the N6 isolates
obtained from Southern China between 2014 and 2016, possessed a complete NA stalk, (470 amino
acids) whereas 10.3% (n = 17) of the N6 isolates possessed an 11-amino acid deletion in the stalk region
(positions 59–69). Interestingly, the H6N6 isolates with the N6-D11b (59–69) deletion were all clustered
within the Asian H5N6 lineage. They were identified in ducks and geese, which suggested that the
stalk deletion of the NA protein may not be the key factor determining the virus host range [24].
The phenotypic e↵ect of these N6 NA deletions warrants further investigation.
6.1.4. Internal Gene Mutations
Mouse infections with avian-origin H6N1 viruses found that polymorphisms PB2-E627K and
PA-T97I in the viral RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RDRP) complex increased the pathogenicity of
H6N1 AIVs [73]. In vitro and in vivo analyses demonstrated that PB2-E627K and PA-T97I mutations
significantly enhance RNA polymerase activity and viral replication thus contributing to enhanced
replication in mammalian cells. E627K has also been shown to increase the replication of H5N1, H7N7,
H7N9 and H9N2 AIVs in mammalian cells by interacting with the human isoform of ANP32 [92,94].
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In a study conducted by Zou et al. all analysed isolates shared several molecular characteristics
associated with AIV virulence, including E627 and D701 mutations in the PB2 gene [30], I38 in the PA
gene; the nontruncated PA-X protein [95,96], and D92 in the NS1 gene. Additionally, S31 was found in
M2 proteins in 191 H6 viruses, indicating no resistance to amantadine [67]. They also discovered that
the expression of the PB1-F2 protein was blocked in 52.0% of the analysed H6 isolates, indicating the
potentially variable virulence [97–100].
Two analysed isolates from Zambia, both H6N2, possessed the human-associated amino acid
methionine at position 475 of the PB2 protein, which is described as being 100% conserved in the
influenza viruses that caused the 1918, 1957 and 1968 human pandemics [101].
Serial passage of mice with a mallard origin H6N1 displayed mammalian adaptation,
with increased pathogenesis caused by PB2-E627K and PA-T97I mutations in the viral RDRP
complex [73].
6.2. Poultry Adaptation of H6Nx Viruses
Influenza viruses of terrestrial poultry origin di↵er from ancestral duck viruses by enhanced
binding to di↵erent receptors. It is suggested that the adaptation to receptors in poultry can enhance the
potential of an avian virus for avian-to-human transmission and pandemic spread [102]. The repertoire
of glycan sugars in chickens di↵ers from that of aquatic birds. Both ↵2,6- and ↵2,3-linked sialic acid
receptors are present in the chicken nasal cavity, upper respiratory tract, and gut, whereas in ducks
↵2,3-linked sialic acid outweighs the proportion of ↵2,6 receptors [103–106]. During poultry adaptation
the binding properties of the HA evolves [45], which may enhance the ability of the virus to infect cells
in the human airway [79]. Conversely, these adaptations that induce fitness in terrestrial poultry may
alter the HA–sialic acid interaction which could adversely a↵ect the ability of that HA to support virus
transmission in humans [107].
A study by Long et al. hypothesises that the acquisition of glycosylation on the HA head domain
is a common evolutionary change in chicken-adapted avian influenza viruses. This in turn may
decrease the strength of binding between virus HA and cell surface sialic acid receptors by steric
hindrance [79,107].
The evolutionary dynamics of chicken-origin H6N2 viruses isolated in South Africa between 2002
and 2013 were investigated [34]. Sub-lineages I and II continued to co-circulate under vaccination
pressure, but sub-lineage I, from which the inactivated vaccine was derived, displayed a markedly
higher mutation rate and a three-fold increase in the emergence of potential antigenic sites on the
globular head of HA compared to sub-lineage II. Immunological pressure culminated in a critical
phenotypic change with several isolates losing the ability to hemagglutinate chicken erythrocytes.
Co-assortment of the HA, NA and M genes in the respective sub-lineages contrasted reassortment of
the other internal protein genes, and the vaccine seed strain itself was the probable donor of segments
to sub-lineage II field strains [34].
Wang et al. [66] found that the chicken-H6N1-190E-228G HA mutant does not have as strong
binding a nity as the duck-H6N1 HA does, indicating that other amino acid substitutions in the
receptor-binding site could alter the binding a nity to avian-like receptors. They also found that
recent biological characterisation of 256 H6 viruses from LBMs in China revealed that around 34% of
H6N2 and H6N6 viruses could bind human-type receptors while maintaining an overall preference for
avian receptors [66]. Yang et al. [108] performed a similar study to Tzarum et al. [88] using the same
Taiwan2 HA and an avian H6 HA for comparison. Functional and structural data for the Taiwan2 HAs
were very similar. The avian H6 HA was found to bind better and to a broader range of ↵2,3-SAs than
the human H6 HA [108].
The HA of the 1999 and 2000 terrestrial viruses do not contain a multibasic cleavage site; but do
contain a unique insertion of aspartic acid (D) in HA1 between positions 144 and 145 (H3 numbering).
The NA of these terrestrial H6N1 viruses have a deletion of 19 amino acids which is a key feature of
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A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1). Amino acid deletions within the NA stalk are a marker of adaptation
from ducks to chickens for other subtypes, including H9N2.
Neuraminidase phylogeny showed that all N6 genes from Chinese poultry belonged to the
Eurasian lineage and likely originated from H6N6 strains circulating in Eastern China during 2005 and
2006. Additionally, phylogenetic analysis identified that the PB2 gene of H6 AIVs were found in 52.5%
of H5N6 AIVs isolates. Only 2% of the aquatic poultry tracheal swab samples were positive (16/911)
with the other 98% of viruses isolated from cloacal or faecal swabs. This suggests that the H6 viruses
isolated from this study primarily replicate in the gut [23] which is not usually considered typical of
LPAI infections [109].
Antigenic and genetic characterisation of two novel H6N2 viruses isolated from apparently
healthy domestic ducks in India between 2014 and 2015 revealed antigenic divergence between
the two isolates; A/duck/India/11CL01/2014 (Kerala14) and A/duck/India/12CL22/2015 (Assam15).
The sequence analyses indicated that both the viruses are of avian origin with ↵2,3 avian receptor
specificity, low pathogenesis in poultry and sensitive to oseltamivir. However, Kerala14 (H6N2) had the
V27Imutationmarker indicating increased amantadine resistance in theM2 gene. Phylogenetic analysis
revealed that both the viruses belonged to distinct clades and that both viruses are novel reassortants
with genetically distinct gene constellations. The results suggest independent introductions of the two
H6N2 viruses and that migratory wild birds in the Central Asian flyway may be the source of H6N2
viruses in ducks in India [34] and subsequently replicate how H6Nx have become prevalent globally.
7. Vaccination and Control
The circulation of influenzaH6 subtype viruses in domestic birds highlights the need to develop an
H6 vaccine to prevent potential influenza pandemics caused by the H6 viruses. The active circulation
of the viruses and their ability to reassort with other AIVs, and subsequently their naturally distinct
antigenicity could pose a challenge for vaccine development and selection in the event of a pandemic
if novel H6 viruses were to arise [20].
A study by Chen et al. [110], based on the serum antibody cross-reactivity data obtained
from 14 di↵erent H6 viruses from Eurasian and North American lineages, A/duck/HK/182/77,
A/teal/HK/W312/97, and A/mallard/Alberta/89/85 were selected to produce live attenuated H6
candidate vaccines. Intranasal administration of a single dose of the three H6 candidate vaccine
viruses (CVVs) induced neutralising antibodies in mice and ferrets and fully protected mice and
ferrets from homologous wild-type (wt) virus challenge. Among the three H6 vaccine candidates,
the A/teal/HK/W312/97 CVV provided the broadest cross-protection against challenge with three
antigenically distinct H6 wt viruses. This data supports the rationale for further evaluating the
A/teal/HK/W312/97 candidate vaccine in humans [110]. Data suggests that pandemic vaccines with
receptor binding preference to both avian- and human-like receptors is desirable for e cient viral
replication in eggs and for inducing protective immune responses in humans [111].
An inactivated whole virus vaccine used in South Africa, prepared from a 2002 sub-lineage I seed
strain (Figure 4) was introduced to protect birds against clinical disease, but the continued use of this
vaccine has previously been shown to accelerate the antigenic drift within sub-lineage I isolates [34].
H6N2 viruses in South African chickens are mutating and reassorting amongst themselves but have
still remained as a genetically pure lineage (South African sub-lineages I and II (Abolnik et al. 2019),
Figure 4) since their first emergence more than 18 years ago [33]. Greater e↵orts need to be made
towards the continuous isolation and characterisation of field strains for use as Haemagglutinin
Inhibition antigens, new vaccine seed strains and to monitor the zoonotic threat of H6N2 viruses [33].
8. Conclusions and Perspectives
In recent years, outbreaks caused by H6Nx infections have becoming increasingly frequently
identified. Due to the vast geographical distribution of cases, across all nine NA subtypes, and its
non-notifiable status, the true extent of H6Nx prevalence could massively exceed what is reported in
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literature. It causes sustained economic damage to the global poultry industry and is now endemic in
several regions and multiple species.
As evidenced by successful isolation from a human infection, and significant seroconversion
rates amongst poultry workers, H6Nx viruses pose a growing threat to both human and animal
health. Although due to having LPAI classification, compared to HPAI viruses, there is a relatively
low mortality rate with mild disease, there is a very high reassortment rate with proven adaptive
changes. H6Nx infections are becoming more poultry adapted and have demonstrated ability to
change receptor binding preference in several mammalian species. There is also the pandemic potential
due to various viruses acting as progenitor and precursor strains to zoonotic viruses; e.g., H6N1 and
the 1997 HPAI H5N1.
H6Nx viruses have a broad host range from which isolates have been successfully
obtained—including from swine—which is of particular interest due to their susceptibility to both
human and avian-origin influenza viruses, and their increased risk for mammalian adapted reassortant
viruses and subsequent pandemic potential.
Both the prominence, and increasing frequency of, H6Nx infections highlights the warranted
need for increased surveillance e↵orts globally and particularly throughout the UK and Europe,
wheremultiple outbreaks ofH6N1have beenparticularly problematic in recentweeks. This surveillance
should also be continued in endemic regions, especially in poultry workers and vaccinated poultry.
Additionally, the need for a concise and globally recognised lineage and nomenclature system is highly
relevant and would allow better understanding of the potential threat of new reassortant and emerging
H6Nx viruses.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4915/12/6/673/s1,
Figure S1: Phylogeny of H6 segments as Figure 4, but with tips coloured by NA type of that virus.
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